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Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride: Business
Deregulation in the Trump Era
By Joan MacLeod Heminway*
Donald J. Trump campaigned for election as President of the United
States of America on a platform that, among other things, promised
deregulation at the federal level. His campaign rhetoric was florid and
strong.
One of the keys to unlocking growth is scaling-back years of disastrous
regulations unilaterally imposed by our out-of-control bureaucracy.
Regulations have grown into a massive, job-killing industry—and the
regulation industry is one business I will put an end to.
In 2015 alone, federal agencies issued over 3,300 final rules and
regulations, up from 2,400 the prior year. Every year, overregulation
costs our economy $2 trillion dollars a year and reduces household
wealth by almost $15,000 dollars.
I’ve proposed a moratorium on new federal regulations that are not
compelled by Congress or public safety, and I will eliminate all
needless and job-killing regulations now on the books.1

*Rick Rose Distinguished Professor of Law, The University of Tennessee College of
Law. Brown University (A.B., 1982); New York University School of Law (J.D., 1985). I
gratefully acknowledge the research assistance of Andrew Cox (The University of
Tennessee (J.D./M.P.P.A., expected 2020)) and research funding provided by The
University of Tennessee College of Law. I also am thankful for suggestions received from
readers of the Business Law Prof Blog in response to a blog post relating to this Essay and
from attendees at the 2018 National Business Law Scholars Conference and the
2018 Mercer Law Review Symposium, “Corporate Law in the Trump Era.” Comments from
Linda Jellum and Steve Johnson at the latter were especially helpful. The substantial body
of research represented in this Essay was completed in November 2018. Updates are
provided in areas to the extent editorial restrictions permitted them to be made.
1. Tessa Berenson, Read Donald Trump’s Speech on Jobs and the Economy, TIME
(Sept. 15, 2016), http://time.com/4495507/donald-trump-economy-speech-transcript/.
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Many may remember his specific campaign trail criticism of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 2 comprehensive
federal legislative regulation adopted in the wake of the 2008 financial
crisis.3 In the last few months of the campaign, Trump specifically
targeted tax4 and energy5 reforms as key areas of emphasis. However,
general promises of regulatory change, as well as other specific
deregulation proposals and assurances, peppered candidate Trump’s
campaign trail missives.6
It often seems that campaign promises fall by the wayside after
candidates for elected office are, in fact, elected. Yet, after his election as
U.S. President, Trump followed through on his deregulatory promises
with early executive orders and related initiatives. Business deregulation
has occupied a central role in the Trump Administration’s agenda. For
those of us who represent business clients on a regular basis or teach in
the business law area, this focus is of particular interest.
Information about the current administration’s business deregulation
initiatives is somewhat fragmented and its coverage in the media may be
biased or politicized. In general, the administration and others who rely
on simple success metrics present a rosy tale. The story line is easy to
understand: deregulation is being achieved since there are fewer
regulations and there is less regulatory cost. These positive reports often
sound like puffery.
Research reports and related commentary generated by think tanks
and other research organizations are a promising and less partisan
2. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
3. See, e.g., Reuters, Donald Trump Says He Would Dismantle Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Regulation, FORTUNE (May 18, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/trump-doddfrank-wall-street/ (“Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump said on Tuesday that
sweeping financial reforms put in place under President Barack Obama were harming the
economy and he would dismantle nearly all of them.”).
4. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 1 (“It begins with bold new tax reform.”); Read
Donald Trump’s Economic Speech in Detroit, TIME (Aug. 8, 2016), http://time.com/
4443382/donald-trump-economic-speech-detroit-transcript/ (“First, let’s talk tax reform.
Taxes are one of the biggest differences in this race.”).
5. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 1 (“Energy reform is central to our plan as well.”);
Read Donald Trump’s Economic Speech in Detroit, supra note 4 (“Also critical to our
economic renewal will be energy reform.”); John W. Miller, Donald Trump Promises
Deregulation of Energy Production, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.wsj.
com/articles/donald-trump-promises-deregulation-of-energy-production-1474566335.
6. See, e.g., Berenson, supra note 1 (“One of the keys to unlocking growth is
scaling-back years of disastrous regulations unilaterally imposed by our out-of-control
bureaucracy. Regulations have grown into a massive, job-killing industry—and the
regulation industry is one business I will put an end to.”); Read Donald Trump’s Economic
Speech in Detroit, supra note 4 (“I will have one overriding goal when it comes to regulation:
I want to keep jobs and wealth in America.”).
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source of information on deregulation. Yet these organizations have
political agendas or policy biases of their own. Part II of this Essay offers
summary reports on the recent deregulation publications of some of these
research institutions. Their deregulation assessments are decidedly
mixed, even if not always split simply along political lines. Regulatory
change typically creates winners and losers; as a result, deregulatory
reports often reflect the identity and bias of the reporter.
This Essay identifies and takes stock of the Trump Administration’s
deregulatory efforts as they impact business interests, with the thought
that even incomplete or biased information may be useful to
transactional business lawyering. What of significance has been done to
date? With what articulated policy goals, if any? How may—or how
should—the success of the administration’s business deregulatory plans
and programs be judged? What observations can be made about those
successes? For example, who may win and lose in the revised regulatory
framework that may emerge? The Essay approaches these questions
from a transactional business law perspective and offers related
observations. Spoiler Alert: to date, the deregulatory journey is
characterized by haphazardness not unlike the motorcar experience that
is the subject of the beloved Disneyland attraction, Mr. Toad’s Wild
Ride—a joyride that includes surprises and may sometimes feel like it is
taking us “merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily, merrily on our way to
nowhere in particular!”7
I. THE PRESIDENT’S BUSINESS DEREGULATORY AGENDA
Although presidents have some constitutional power to regulate and
deregulate, they cannot alone completely effectuate any significant
deregulatory agenda.8 Having said that, their constitutional role and
political status afford them a number of ways to direct or influence
7. See The Original Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride, YESTERLAND, https://www.yesterland.
com/mrtoad.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2018) (describing and summarizing the history of
the attraction, and noting the ride’s “catchy theme song . . . ‘We’re merrily, merrily, merrily,
merrily, merrily on our way to nowhere in particular!’”).
8. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Designing Deregulation: The POTUS’s Place in
the Process, 88 UMKC L. REV. 653, 657 (2019) (“Under the Constitution, the congressional
power to regulate conduct is therefore quite direct (even if not always perfectly clear)—
more direct than the corresponding power granted to the president.”); Stephen M. Johnson,
Indeconstructible: The Triumph of the Environmental “Administrative State,” 86 U. CIN. L.
REV. 653, 653 (2018) (“While the President can use a variety of tools, including the
appointment power, budget power, treaty power, and executive orders, to influence the
manner in which . . . agencies interpret and enforce laws, the President has very little power
to unilaterally ‘deconstruct the administrative state.’ The ‘administrative state’ is a
creation of Congress and the President can only ‘deconstruct’ it with the full cooperation of
Congress.”).
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deregulation. These include both informal and formal means. For
instance, informally, the president can set policy or signal regulatory
change through the release of executive orders as well as in general
speeches and communications, including in conferences with legislative
leaders.9 On a more formal level, the president’s general constitutional
power as the executive in appointing high-level government officials
enables him to put into place deregulatory henchmen.10
However, the president also has other specific express constitutional
powers that can have a deregulatory impact. These include the
presidential power to veto, make treaties, seek opinions from federal
officials, comment on the state of the union, and participate in ensuring
faithful legal compliance.11 The Trump Administration has employed
these tools in forwarding the business deregulatory program heralded by
the Trump presidential campaign.
For example, candidate Trump vowed to take immediate action on
deregulation as president, promising in one speech, “Upon taking office,
I will issue a temporary moratorium on new agency regulations.”12 He
kept this campaign promise by signing an Executive Order on Reducing
Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs in January 2017. 13 In
principal part, the order requires the elimination of two existing
regulations for each new regulation adopted and mandates that “the total
incremental cost of all new regulations, including repealed regulations,
to be finalized this year shall be no greater than zero.”14 Following on
that initial executive order, in early February 2017, the Office of
Management and Budget’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
published a related guidance memorandum.15 An additional
memorandum was issued in April 2017. 16 In February 2017, the
9. See Heminway, supra note 8, at 662, 670–71.
10. See id. at 667–69.
11. See id. at 655–56, 662–67.
12. Read Donald Trump’s Economic Speech in Detroit, supra note 4.
13. Exec. Order No. 13771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017). Commentators commonly
describe this as the president’s “two-for-one executive order.”
14. Id.
15. Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Admin., Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies & Managing &
Exec. Dirs. of Certain Agencies & Comm’ns, Interim Guidance Implementing Section 2 of
the Executive Order of January 30, 2017, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling
Regulatory Costs” (Feb. 2, 2017), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files
/briefing-room/presidential-actions/related-omb-material/eo_iterim_guidance_reducing_re
gulations_controlling_regulatory_costs.pdf.
16. Memorandum from Dominic J. Mancini, Acting Admin., Office of Info. &
Regulatory Affairs, to Regulatory Policy Officers at Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies & Managing &
Exec. Dirs. of Certain Agencies & Comm’ns, Guidance Implementing Executive Order
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president signed a further executive order, Enforcing the Regulatory
Reform Agenda, articulating a “policy of the United States to alleviate
unnecessary regulatory burdens placed on the American people” and
processes for realizing that policy goal.17
In appointing members of his cabinet and other federal government
officials, the president has chosen many individuals who have publicly
affirmed that they share the president’s vision for deregulation.18
Perhaps most infamously, the president initially chose Scott Pruitt, a
frequent and sharp critic of environmental regulation, to lead the
Environmental Protection Agency.19 The president’s chosen successor to
Pruitt, Andrew Wheeler, comes from a professional background that
indicates a similar opposition to environmental regulation. 20 Other
cabinet-level choices (including Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development Ben Carson, Secretary of Education Betsy DeVos, former
Secretary of Health and Human Services Tom Price, and Secretary of
Commerce Wilbur Ross) have also raised fundamental questions about
the desirability and efficacy of the regulatory scheme under their
control—policy positions they held before their appointment as cabinet
officials.21

13771, Titled “Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs” (Apr. 5, 2017),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memoranda/2017/M-17-21OMB.pdf.
17. Exec. Order 13777, 82 Fed. Reg. 12285 (Feb. 24, 2017).
18. See generally Nick Timiraos & Andrew Tangel, Donald Trump’s Cabinet Selections
Signal Deregulation Moves Are Coming, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 8, 2017), https:
//www.wsj.com/articles/donald-trump-cabinet-picks-signal-deregulation-moves-are-coming
-1481243006 (“Business leaders are predicting a dramatic unraveling of regulations on
everything from overtime pay to power-plant emission rules as Donald Trump seeks to fill
his cabinet with determined adversaries of the agencies they will lead.”).
19. See, e.g., Coral Davenport, Senate Confirms Scott Pruitt as E.P.A. Head, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/17/us/politics/scott-pruitt-environmen
tal-protection-agency.html; Chris Mooney et al., Trump Names Scott Pruitt, Oklahoma
Attorney General Suing EPA on Climate Change, to Head the EPA, WASH. POST (Dec. 8,
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2016 /12/07/trumpnames-scott-pruitt-oklahoma-attorney-general-suing-epa-on-climate-change-to-head-the-e
pa/?utm_term=.6c027995b772; Alexander Nazaryan, How the EPA’s Scott Pruitt Became
the Most Dangerous Member of Trump’s Cabinet, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 8, 2018),
https://www.newsweek.com/2018/02/16/scott-pruitt-most-dangerous-member-trump-cabi
net-801035. html.
20. See, e.g., Lisa Friedman, Scott Pruitt’s Environmental Rollbacks Stumbled in
Court. His Successor Is More Thorough, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.
com/2018/11/21/climate/andrew-wheeler-epa.html; Ken Kimmell, EPA Nominee Andrew
Wheeler Is Even Worse than Scott Pruitt, CNN (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.cnn.com
/2019/01/15/opinions/andrew-wheeler-bad-choice-epa-kimmell/index.html.
21. See Mooney et al., supra note 19; Timiraos & Tangel, supra note 18.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379940

(HEMINWAY DO NOT DELETE)

592

4/1/2019 2:02 PM

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

The president’s deregulatory process has not included vetoes or treaty
making. In fact, the president’s veto threats and single veto to date to
have been used to increase (rather than decrease) regulation through the
construction of a more complete Mexican border wall. Late in 2018, the
president threatened a budget veto because of Congress’s reluctance to
approve funds for the border wall, resulting in the longest federal
government shutdown in history (following on an earlier veto threat in
the spring of 2018),22 and in March 2019, the president vetoed a joint
resolution of Congress terminating his February 15 declaration of a
national emergency relating to the Mexican border.23 As for treaty
making, an executive order was drafted (but never signed) calling for a
moratorium on multilateral treaties.24 International trade initiatives in
the Trump presidency have largely enlarged regulation or constitute
re-regulation; tariffs on imports have increased and conditions on
favorable trade treatment have been enhanced.25 In sum, “[w]hile
22. See, e.g., Clare Foran, Current Shutdown Breaks Record for Longest Government
Shutdown in US History, CNN (Jan. 12, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/2019/01/12/politics/
government-shutdown-breaks-record-longest-ever/index.html; David Jackson, Hours After
Veto Threat, Trump Signs Spending Bill, Avoiding Government Shutdown, USA TODAY
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/03/23/trump-threat
ens-veto-spending-bill-raises-possibility-government-shutdown/452273002/; Erica Werner
et al., Trump Says He Won’t Sign Senate Deal to Avert Shutdown, Demands Funds for
Border Security, WASH. POST (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/
economy/trump-continues-retreat-on-government-shutdown-threat-pledges-to-renew-bor
der-control-battle-in-2019/2018/12/20/3143a752-0457-11e9-b6a9-0aa5c2fcc9e4_story.html?
utm_term=.bb0b88645892.
23. See Vetoes by President Donald J. Trump, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/
reference/Legislation/Vetoes/TrumpDJ.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
24. See Read the Trump Administration’s Draft of the Executive Order on Treaties,
WASH. POST, https://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents/world/read-the-trump-admin
istrations-draft-of-the-executive-order-on-treaties/2307/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2018).
25. See, e.g., Chad P. Bown, The 5 Surprising Things About the New USMCA Trade
Agreement, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkeycage/wp/2018/10/09/the-5-surprising-things-about-the-new-usmca-trade-agreement/?utm_
term=.6deb9103b90f (commenting on, among other things, new conditions to tariff-free
sales of automobiles and trucks into the United States from Canada and Mexico); Sheelah
Kolhatkar, Trump’s Rebrand of NAFTA, NEW YORKER (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.new
yorker.com/news/news-desk/trumps-rebrand-of-nafta
(“The
U.S.M.C.A.
maintains
NAFTA’S continental free-trade zone and most of its provisions, while offering some
increased benefits to American workers.”); Keith Naughton & Joe Deaux, Ford Ratchets Up
Rebuke of Trump Tariffs as Steel Costs Rise, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 22, 2018),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-22/ford-says-trump-tariffs-makes-u-ssteel-costliest-in-the-world (noting the effects of Trump Administration steel tariffs on the
U.S. automobile manufacturing industry); Jim Tankersley & Keith Bradsher, Trump Hits
China with Tariffs on $200 Billion in Goods, Escalating Trade War, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/us/politics/trump-china-tariffs-trade.html
(reporting on new China tariffs and the then-current trade relations with China).
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investment and trade are connected, the White House has been taking
the two issues in opposite directions.”26
In his 2018 and 2019 State of the Union addresses, the president
focused some attention on deregulation, touting his administration’s
early gains in decreasing the size of the regulatory state. 27 For example,
in his 2018 remarks he stated, “In our drive to make Washington
accountable, we have eliminated more regulations in our first year than
any administration in history.”28 He specifically claimed progress in the
energy and auto manufacturing sectors.
We have ended the war on American Energy—and we have ended the
war on clean coal. We are now an exporter of energy to the world.
In Detroit, I halted Government mandates that crippled America’s
autoworkers—so we can get the Motor City revving its engines once
again.29

The president’s use of first-person pronouns in this part of his address is
noticeable—and especially his use of “I” in the last quoted sentence
above. Among other things, he asserts control that exceeds the scope of
his constitutional and practical authority.
The president also has communicated his deregulatory focus and
successes through public statements and reports from cabinet agencies.
The U.S. Department of the Treasury has been a leading messenger in
this campaign, and its April 2018 report (the “Treasury Report”) 30 is a
prominent example. In that report, the Department of the Treasury
professed that “[t]hrough a series of government-wide and
agency-specific orders, the President has launched an historic effort to
reduce existing red tape and limit new regulatory costs.”31 The reported

26. Riley Walters, Trump Administration’s Trade Policies Undermining Business
Benefits of Tax Cuts, Slashing Regulations, HERITAGE FOUND. (June 28, 2018),
https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/trump-administrations-trade-policies-under
mining-business-benefits-tax-cuts.
27. Donald J. Trump, President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address,
WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/presi
dent-donald-j-trumps-state-union-address/; Donald J. Trump, Remarks by President Trump
in State of the Union Address, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.
whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-state-union-address-2/.
28. Trump, President Donald J. Trump’s State of the Union Address, supra note 27.
29. Id.
30. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REGULATORY REFORM ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER
PRESIDENT TRUMP’S EXECUTIVE ORDERS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://home.treasury.gov/
sites/default/files/2018-04/20180423%20Regulatory%20Reform%20Report_0.pdf.
31. Id. at 1.
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progress on the effort in the Department of the Treasury was
summarized in the following chart published in the report:32
Treasury Department
Regulatory Reform Under President Trump’s Executive Orders
By the Numbers
305

Treasury Regulations Eliminated or Proposed to Be Eliminated
or Modified

94

Net Reduction in Regulations on Treasury’s Regulatory Agenda

>250

Specific Treasury Recommendations to Reform & Reduce Burdens
of Financial Regulation

0

Regulatory Actions Under Executive Order 13771

The Treasury Report consisted primarily of detailed information about
deregulatory actions taken by the Department of the Treasury in various
areas of regulatory activity under its control (for example, consumer
financial protection and tax reform). The report concludes with an
optimistic flourish:
Treasury has undertaken extensive efforts to support the President’s
regulatory reform agenda . . . . Treasury’s reports concerning domestic
finance and tax regulation—which make forward-looking
recommendations—will advance the President’s policy of regulatory
efficiency in support of lower individual and corporate compliance
burdens and more robust economic growth for years to come.33

Earlier in 2017, the Department of the Treasury had issued a separate
report on improving efficiency in bank and credit union regulation in
which it detailed ways in which the department could engage the task of
regulatory reform.34
Finally, the president has used his bully pulpit in other ways to
forward his administration’s deregulatory agenda. For example, he
offered public remarks on deregulation in December 2017. 35 Somewhat
more recently, he gave a deregulation speech at a Conservative Political
32. Id. at 2 (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 20.
34. See STEVEN T. MNUCHIN & CRAIG S. PHILLIPS, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, A FINANCIAL
SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf.
35. See Remarks by President Trump on Deregulation, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Dec. 14,
2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-deregu
lation/.
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Action Conference event.36 Later still, in October 2018, he focused in on
environmental deregulation in a talk for the National Electrical
Contractors Association.37 Overall, Trump’s presidency has been
characterized by significant public appearances that aggressively
promote his proposed and actual deregulatory policies.
II. THIRD-PARTY ASSESSMENTS OF AND REACTIONS TO THE
PRESIDENT’S DEREGULATORY REGIME
The media has commented extensively on the Trump presidency,
including in the area of deregulation.38 That commentary has been
wide-ranging and, in general, highly politicized. Although the reporting
of all responsible news outlets is founded on sourced facts, the choice of
topic and angle can influence the conclusions reached by the authors.
They do not purport to be—and generally are not—researchers of law or
policy.
As a result, this Essay’s survey of third-party commentary on the
Trump deregulation regime focuses on think tanks and other research
organizations. These research organizations do have well-known
perspectives—they typically exist to serve as advocates for populations
with specific policy objectives. However, the missions and perspectives of
these organizations are publicly disclosed, and the researchers employ
specified methodologies that permit synthesis, critique, verification, and
rebuttal. The articulated mission and perspective of each is represented
in the summary of its observations in this part.
A. American Action Forum
The American Action Forum is a relatively new policy research
organization. Founded and established in 2009–2010, it claims to
“proudly lead[] the center-right on economic and fiscal policy issues.” 39
AllSides has not published a news media bias for the American Action

36. See Myron Ebell, President Trump in CPAC Speech Says Deregulation is as
Important as Tax Cuts, COMPETITIVE ENTERPRISE INST. (Feb. 23, 2018), https://cei.org/
blog/president-trump-cpac-speech-says-deregulation-important-tax-cuts.
37. See Susan Phillips, Trump Touts Environmental Deregulation in Philadelphia,
WHYY (Oct. 3, 2018), https://whyy.org/articles/trump-touts-environmental-deregulationin-philadelphia/.
38. Many of the sources cited in support of the claims made in Part I of this Essay are
examples of this media coverage.
39. About, AM. ACTION F., https://www.americanactionforum.org/about/ (last visited
Nov. 15, 2018).
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Forum, but Media Bias/Fact Check concurs with the organization’s own
assessment that it has a Right-Center bias.40
The American Action Forum tracks key regulatory data through a
project called Regulatory Rodeo. As of September 25, 2018, its data shows
that 498 new regulations were enacted in 2017 and 2018 with a total
finalized cost of $23.8 billion and a 23,858,014 hour decrease in
paperwork.41 The number of new regulations, their total finalized cost,
and the number of paperwork hours, all decreased in 2018 from 2017,
and the decrease in overall regulatory cost for 2018 is calculated at
$6,762,024,341.42 Only six new regulations were finalized in 2017 and
2018 in the areas of business assistance, commerce, and commercial
practices, with a negative total finalized cost—$-4.5 million—and a total
of 16,448 paperwork hours.43
As of May 2018, a summary article highlights that the Trump
Administration is exceeding its two-for-one goal and its annualized
savings objectives by $517.4 million, and that executive agencies are
expected to double their annualized savings target. 44 Overall, the authors
note that
[t]his update is now the third from the Trump Administration, and its
rulemaking record is becoming more fully formed. The administration
is prioritizing deregulation, and it is set to double its goals of a
two-for-one deregulatory-to-regulatory ratio and $686.6 million in net
savings.45

This report is the least qualified in my sample, but it focuses narrowly
on specific quantitative measures.
B. American Enterprise Institute
The American Enterprise Institute was founded in 1938. 46 It “is a
public policy think tank dedicated to defending human dignity,

40. See American Action Forum, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK, https://mediabiasfact check.
com/american-action-forum/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
41. See Explore the Data, REGULATION RODEO, http://regrodeo.com/ (last visited Sept.
25, 2018) (viewing data for 2017 and 2018).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. See Dan Bosch & Dan Goldbeck, The Trump Administration’s Deregulatory
Progress and Forecast, AM. ACTION F. (May 21, 2018), https://www.americanactionforum.
org/research/the-trump-administrations-deregulatory-progress-and-forecast/#ixzz5S7I2T
NRv.
45. Id.
46. About, AEI, http://www.aei.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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expanding human potential, and building a freer and safer world.” 47
AllSides classifies its media bias as Lean Right.48 Media Bias/Fact Check
indicates that the American Enterprise Institute has a Right bias.49
To date, the American Enterprise Institute mostly offers articles and
blog posts in support of its positions on the Trump Administration’s
deregulatory efforts. For example, an October 2017 article posits, “[T]he
problem of excessive regulation was so severe, and has been such an
impediment to economic growth, that the mere slowing of new
regulations can stimulate substantial new business confidence,
investment, and hiring. And a slowing has occurred since Donald Trump
took office.”50 Later, in February 2018, a post noted that the Trump
deregulatory agenda then appeared to have had a limited economic effect,
citing a Goldman Sachs report.51 A more recent article expresses a
similar cautionary tale.52 As with the Brookings Institution publications
referenced infra Part II.C., the American Enterprise Institute offerings
make limited assessments at this point in the Trump Administration’s
tenure.
C. The Brookings Institution
The Brookings Institution is “the first private organization devoted to
analyzing public policy issues at the national level.”53 Founded in 1916,
its “mission is to conduct in-depth research that leads to new ideas for
solving problems facing society at the local, national, and global level.” 54
47. Id.
48. See American Enterprise Institute, ALLSIDES, https://www.allsides.com/news-sou
rce/american-enterprise-institute (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
49. See American Enterprise Institute, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK, https://mediabiasfact
check.com/american-enterprise-institute/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
50. Peter J. Wallison, Trump’s Deregulation Efforts Are Driving Market Dynamism,
AEI (Oct. 13, 2017), http://www.aei.org/publication/trumps-deregulation-efforts-are-driv
ing-market-dynamism/.
51. See James Pethokoukis, What’s Been the Economic Impact of Trump’s Deregulation
Push?, AEI (Feb. 12, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/whats-been-the-economic-im
pact-of-trumps-deregulation-push/.
52. See James Pethokoukis, Has Donald Trump Really Made America (Economically)
Great Again?, AEI (June 25, 2018), http://www.aei.org/publication/has-donald-trump-real
ly-made-america-economically-great-again/ (“[I]t could take years before economists are
able to tease out any significant growth impacts from cutting business taxes or
deregulation. In economic projections, there are no guarantees—other than Trump will
surely try to take credit.”).
53. See Brookings Institution History, BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.edu/aboutus/brookings-institution-history/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
54. About Us, BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/ (last visited Nov. 14,
2018).
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AllSides categorizes the Brookings Institution as Center. 55 Media
Bias/Fact Check classifies the Brookings Institution as having a
Left-Center bias.56
The Brookings Institution is tracking current deregulatory initiatives
on an ongoing basis on a part of its website. 57 It describes the tracking
application as follows:
The Brookings Deregulatory Tracker (Reg Tracker) is a tool that
tracks and provides insights into deregulatory actions under the
Trump administration. Launched in October 2017, the Reg Tracker
monitors a curated selection of delayed, repealed, and new rules,
notable guidance and policy revocations, and important court battles.
The rules span a wide range of policy areas, including but not limited
to education, finance, environment, and transportation.58

In the financial regulation area, for example, the tracker features a
number of business deregulation initiatives, including the repeal of the
Department of Labor’s fiduciary rule (which imposed a fiduciary duty on
financial professionals advising on retirement assets or retirement
planning) after a March 2018 opinion and order of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invalidated the rule.59 Brookings
identifies several different types of deregulatory conduct: “[r]educing
restrictions on conduct”; “[r]emoving outdated, inconsistent, or otherwise
unnecessary rules”; “[e]liminating particular disfavored regulatory
impacts”; and “[i]ncreasing competition in a regulated market.” 60

55. Brookings Institute, ALLSIDES, https://www.allsides.com/news-source/brookingsinstitute (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
56. Brookings Institute, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK, https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
brookings-institute/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
57. Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.
brookings.edu/interactives/tracking-deregulation-in-the-trump-era/ (updated regularly)
(last visited Feb. 22, 2019).
58. Siddhi Doshi et al., Explaining the Brookings Deregulatory Tracker, BROOKINGS
(Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/10/18/explaining-the-brook
ings-deregulatory-tracker/.
59. Tracking Deregulation in the Trump Era, BROOKINGS, https://www.brookings.
edu/interactives/brookings-deregulatory-tracker/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).
60. See Connor Raso, What does “Deregulation” Actually Mean in the Trump Era?,
BROOKINGS (Nov. 1. 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-deregulationactually-mean-in-the-trump-era/.
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Coauthors of a Brookings Institution report, issued in October 2017,
expressed concern that the president’s two-for-one executive order will
fail to achieve regulatory efficiency and effectiveness. 61
[I]n the United States the regulatory budget will attempt to get much
closer to real social costs, at the expense of adding considerable
complexity. That makes it potentially more meaningful and deep
reaching, but also more likely to bog down and create a massive
bureaucratic headache to go with those that already exist.
That makes the disappointing scenarios for the regulatory budget
rather plausible, but not inevitable: that it will become not an engine
for reform, but instead will provide a blunt instrument that either
obstructs new regulations (irrespective of whether or not they are
welfare-enhancing) or leads to new regulations coupled with
haphazard cutting of existing regulations (again, failing to distinguish
between the [sic] those that do and do not enhance social welfare).62

In a blog post close in time to the release of the two-for-one executive
order, I raised similar issues in a somewhat more lighthearted way,
analogizing the two-for-one concept to closet cleaning.63
The coauthors of the October 2017 report ultimately conclude that the
efficacy of this type of “regulatory budget” depends on how the regulators
and those who are regulated use this deregulatory tool, placing the key
responsibility in the hands of Trump Administration officials.64
[I]f it turns out that the most that can be said about the economic
burdens of regulation is that some people like to lodge more or less
aesthetic complaints about them—then regulatory budgeting will fail.
But if, as seems more likely, there are lots of opportunities to bring old
regulations up to date with modern realities, and plenty of
accumulated detritus to clear out, then the regulatory budget offers a

61. See TED GAYER ET AL., EVALUATING THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S REGULATORY
REFORM PROGRAM 11 (2017), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/eval
uatingtrumpregreform_gayerlitanwallach_102017.pdf.
62. Id. at 16.
63. Joan Heminway, Cleaning Out the Regulatory Closet: An Analogy for
Consideration . . ., BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Feb. 6, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/
business_law/2017/02/cleaning-out-the-regulatory-closet-an-analogy-for-consideration-.ht
ml; see also Joan Heminway, Balancing the Regulatory Budget: Another Analogy for
Consideration, BUS. L. PROF. BLOG (Feb. 20, 2017), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/bus
iness_law/2017/02/balancing-the-regulatory-budget-another-analogy-for-consideration.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
64. GAYER ET AL., supra note 61, at 16.
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much needed spur to action. It is up to the administration to carefully
work this system out and realize this best-case scenario.65

If the coauthors are correct, the quality of the appointed officials may
make a difference. The president has broad authority to appoint
high-level officials who can implement the president’s plan.66
Several other Brookings Institution deregulatory policy pieces assess
Trump era deregulation initiatives. A June 2018 article finds that
“agencies under Trump significantly reduced the total amount of
rulemaking relative to prior administrations across the board.”67 More
specifically, a brief article published in September 2018 concludes that,
to date, “[o]n balance, . . . the picture is one of inaction. The Trump
Administration has halted the growth of regulation that imposes costs
but so far has left the existing regulatory framework largely in place.” 68
The aggregate picture is quite mixed, but overall, the authors seem to be
taking a too-early-to-tell view on the success of the Trump deregulatory
agenda.
D. Cato Institute
The Cato Institute was founded in 1977. 69 It engages in “public policy
research . . . dedicated to the principles of individual liberty, limited
government, free markets, and peace.” 70 It considers its researchers
“independent” and “nonpartisan.”71 AllSides classifies the Cato Institute
(blog) media bias rating as Lean Right.72 According to Media Bias/Fact
Check, the Cato Institute has a Right-Center bias.73
A March 2017 article offers hope that the Trump deregulation plan
may be efficacious (averring that “the cost limit and the one-in, two-out
requirement . . . could be useful exercises to cull poor federal
65. Id. at 17.
66. See supra text accompanying note 10.
67. Connor Raso, Where and Why Has Agency Rulemaking Declined Under Trump?,
BROOKINGS (June 29, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/where-and-why-hasagency-rulemaking-declined-under-trump/.
68. Connor Raso, How Has Trump’s Deregulatory Order Worked in Practice?,
BROOKINGS (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-has-trumps-deregu
latory-order-worked-in-practice/.
69. See About CATO, CATO INST., https://www.cato.org/about?utm_source=cato_
header &utm_medium=menu&utm_campaign=submenu (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See Cato Institute (blog), ALLSIDES (Nov. 15, 2018), https://www.allsides. com/newssource/cato-institute.
73. See Cato Institute, MEDIA BIAS/FACT CHECK, https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/catoinstitute/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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regulations”), while at the same time expressing some concern that the
Trump Administration has the wherewithal to achieve its deregulatory
potential.74 Somewhat more recently, in December 2017, a Cato author
notes that the expansion of trade regulation represents an obvious
counterbalance to the Trump Administration’s deregulatory efforts. 75 An
April 2018 article offers general deregulatory praise, while noting that
financial services need specific deregulatory attention.76 As with research
published by the Brookings Institution and the American Enterprise
Institute, Cato’s publications temper optimism with caution and advice.
E. Center for American Progress
The Center for American Progress describes itself as “an independent
nonpartisan policy institute that is dedicated to improving the lives of all
Americans, through bold, progressive ideas, as well as strong leadership
and concerted action.”77 Among its expressed values is the belief that “an
effective government can earn the trust of the American people,
champion the common good over narrow self-interest, and harness the
strength of our diversity.”78 AllSides rates the Center for American
Progress as Lean Left,79 and Media Bias/Fact Check describes it as
having a Left bias.80
As a left-leaning research organization, the Center for American
Progress is not focused on counting the number of regulations adopted or
rescinded, or calculating reductions in regulatory cost. Instead, in

74. See Thomas A. Firey, Dire Fears of Trump Deregulation, CATO INST. (Mar. 13,
2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/dire-fears-trump-deregulation (“[T]he devil is in the
details, and the Trump administration’s performance so far gives little confidence about its
ability to manage details.”).
75. Simon Lester, Deregulation vs. More Regulation in the Trump Administration,
CATO INST. (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.cato.org/blog/deregulation-vs-regulation-trumpadministration (“Nevertheless, when you hear people tout Trump’s push for lessening the
burden of regulation, keep in mind that with trade policy, we are seeing a regulatory
expansion.”).
76. See Diego Zuluaga, Financial Services Deregulation, CATO INST. (Apr. 9, 2018),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/financial-services-deregulation
(“Regulatory rollback has been a bright spot of this administration, but financial services
remain clogged by red tape. For financial innovation and credit access to reach all
Americans, that must change.”).
77. About, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS, https://www.americanprogress.org/about/mission/
(last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
78. Id.
79. See Center for American Progress, ALLSIDES, https://www.allsides.com/newssource/center-american-progress (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
80. See
Center
for
American
Progress,
MEDIA
BIAS/FACT
CHECK,
https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/center-for-american-progress/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379940

(HEMINWAY DO NOT DELETE)

602

4/1/2019 2:02 PM

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70

measuring deregulatory success, its researchers are focused on the
substantive changes effected by deregulation. For example, three
economic policy experts affiliated with the Center for American Progress
cautioned against financial deregulation in a December 2017 research
report.81 Asserting that “[t]he painful memory of the 2007–2008 financial
crisis is clearly fading for some policymakers in the Republican-led
Congress and the Trump administration,” 82 the researchers offer policy
proposals on a number of different financial regulatory matters that they
see as important in lessening our susceptibility to another financial
crisis. They suggest that other financial regulatory reforms also would be
beneficial.83 Additional deregulatory commentary from the Center for
American Progress relates to, for example, its effects on workers and the
environment.84
F. The Heritage Foundation
The Heritage Foundation was founded in 1973 and self-classifies
strongly as a conservative “research and educational institution.”85 “The
mission of The Heritage Foundation is to formulate and promote

81. Gregg Gelzinis et al., Resisting Financial Deregulation, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS
(Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2017/12/04/4436
11/resisting-financial-deregulation/.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See, e.g., Osub Ahmed et al., Scott Pruitt Threatens Reproductive and
Environmental Justice for Women, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://
www.americanprogress.org/issues/women/news/2018/04/24/450034/scott-pruitt-threatensreproductive-environmental-justice-women/ (identifying and describing “four ways
Administrator Pruitt’s actions on energy and the environment threaten to harm women’s
health and reproductive justice.”); Sam Berger, Commentary: How Trump is Letting
Businesses Steal Money from Workers, FORTUNE (Jan. 31, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018
/01/31/state-of-the-union-trump-deregulation/?iid=sr-link1 (“Trump has been attacking
regulations that protect workers’ pay, retirement, and safety in order to pad company
profits.”); CAP Energy & Dev. Team, Hands Off Our Air, Water and Public Lands, CTR. FOR
AM. PROGRESS (May 24, 2018), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/green/news
/2017/05/24/432929/hands-off-air-water-public-lands/ (“[E]ven though two out of every
three American voters oppose drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, Trump’s
budget proposes opening this ecologically sensitive and iconic landscape for drilling—and
the inevitable oil spills that follow petroleum development.”); David Madland, Under
President Trump, Workers Continue to Struggle, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Sept. 11, 2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/09/11/457811/president-tr
ump-workers-continue-struggle/ (“A number of Trump’s policies, such as his massive tax
cuts for the wealthy and corporations, have helped the rich gain an ever-growing share of
the economy while doing relatively little for most workers.”).
85. About Heritage, HERITAGE FOUND., https://www.heritage.org/about-heritage/
mission (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
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conservative public policies based on the principles of free enterprise,
limited government, individual freedom, traditional American values,
and a strong national defense.”86 The Heritage Foundation’s AllSides
media bias is Lean Right.87 Media Bias/Fact Check categorizes the
Heritage Foundation as having a Right bias. 88
Like the publications of other research organizations represented in
this Essay, an early 2018 article published by the Heritage Foundation
notes an overall decrease in regulation in calendar year 2017. 89 In calling
out specific areas for attention, the summary in that article focused
largely on deregulation outside the business sphere; however, the author
did address the then current state of the fiduciary rule.90 In more recent
articles published on the site, additional issues are addressed and some
theoretical analysis is provided.
For example, in one recent piece, a Heritage Foundation author
attributes the current strong economy and employment numbers to
Trump-era tax reform and deregulation.91 In another recent article, two
commentators note that “‘Buy American’ policies may not always make
America’s economy great again, as they have the ability to thwart the
dynamic gains from international trade—a key benefit of economic
freedom.”92 They offer strong counsel and prescriptions in concluding
that
[e]conomic policy founded in protectionist principles, while
well-intentioned for some sectors, has the power to stifle American
progress in other parts of the economy.

86. Id.
87. See The Heritage Foundation, ALLSIDES, https://www.allsides.com/news-source/
heritage-foundation (last visited Nov. 15, 2018).
88. See Heritage Foundation, MEDIABIAS/FACTCHECK (Nov. 15, 2018), https://media
biasfactcheck.com/heritage-foundation/.
89. See Diane Katz, 10 Ways the Trump Administration Beat Back Excessive
Regulation in 2017, HERITAGE (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/government-regula
tion/commentary/10-ways-the-trump-administration-beat-back-excessive-regulation
(“Federal rulemaking slowed dramatically in 2017, with the Trump administration issuing
two-thirds fewer regulations in its first year (1,136) than both Presidents Barack Obama
(3,356) and George W. Bush (3,927).”).
90. Id.
91. See David W. Kreutzer, A Great Day for Workers in America, HERITAGE (Nov. 2,
2018), https://www.heritage.org/jobs-and-labor/commentary/great-day-workers-america.
92. See Amanda Snell & Anthony B. Kim, Tariff Exemptions Don’t Cut It. Just Shave
Off Trade Barriers, HERITAGE (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/trade/commentary/
tariff-exemptions-dont-cut-it-just-shave-trade-barriers.
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Dynamic economic growth depends not only on preserving a
competitive, transparent business climate, but also on ensuring the
open markets on which so much of America’s prosperity has been built.
Tax cuts and deregulation have been generating strong economic
growth of more than 3 percent in recent quarters.
The U.S. economy can grow even more if tariffs are lowered and
protectionist policies get dismantled.93

This article, like an earlier piece published in June 2018,94 juxtaposes the
president’s increased trade regulation with his tax reform and
deregulatory activities.95
Other notable deregulation articles from earlier in the year address
the overlap of The Heritage Foundation’s budget policy blueprint with
the president’s budget96 and the unfocused nature of the president’s
economic plan.97 The Heritage Foundation’s website proved to be a
relatively rich source of commentary. The offerings included both praise
for and criticism of the president’s policies and implementation.
G. Institute for Policy Studies
“As Washington’s first progressive multi-issue think tank, the
Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) has served as a policy and research
resource for visionary social justice movements for over four decades.” 98
The IPS engages in a variety of different projects to help ensure that
“everyone has a right to thrive on a planet where all communities are
equitable, democratic, peaceful, and sustainable.” 99 AllSides has not

93. Id.
94. See Riley Walters, Trump Administration’s Trade Policies Undermining Business
Benefits of Tax Cuts, Slashing Regulations, HERITAGE (June 28, 2018), https://www.her
itage.org/trade/commentary/trump-administrations-trade-policies-undermining-businessbenefits-tax-cuts.
95. Snell & Kim, supra note 92.
96. See Romina Boccia & Dody Eid, Trump Budget Embraces Numerous Conservative
Reforms, HERITAGE (June 22, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/budget-and-spending/
commentary/trump-budget-embraces-numerous-conservative-reforms.
97. See Paul Winfree, Trump’s Economic Agenda Is Unfocused. Here’s How to Fix It,
HERITAGE (July 5, 2018), https://www.heritage.org/taxes/commentary/trumps-economicagenda-unfocused-heres-how-fix-it.
98. About, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., https://ips-dc.org/about/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
99. Our Work, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD., https://ips-dc.org/our-work/ (last visited Nov. 19,
2018).
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rated the IPS; Media Bias/Fact Check indicates that the IPS has a Left
bias.100
Like the Center for American Progress, the IPS focuses on the
economic, environmental, and societal effects of deregulation as opposed
to regulatory volume or cost. Many of the areas of its work have been
(and continue to be) impacted by current and proposed deregulatory
initiatives introduced by the Trump Administration. For example,
financial and energy deregulation have predicted effects on economic
justice and climate justice.101
The IPS’s director of Foreign Policy in Focus addressed financial
deregulation in a September 2018 article in which he forecasted more
inequality.102
Economic inequality is not an unintended consequence of
deregulation. It’s one of the goals. You might think that the
administration simply wants to move as much money as it can to the
1 percent before the debt hits the fan. But here’s the really depressing
part. The wealthy make out like bandits during an economic downturn
as well.103

According to this September 2018 article, deregulatory success for
businesses and the more prosperous may create economic inequality that
translates to short-term or long-term economic loss for other
constituencies.104
The IPS also recently criticized energy regulation policy, focusing in
on the air pollution and related human life consequences of coal
deregulation in an August 2018 article.105
[T]he government is again going to war in support of mine owners by
deregulating coal-fired power plants. This time, the target of the war
isn’t striking workers—it’s the public.
Casualties in this war are projected to be steep. By the government’s
own estimate, up to 1,600 people a year are going to die from the

100. See Institute for Policy Studies, MEDIABIAS/FACTCHECK, https://mediabiasfact
check.com/institute-policy-studies/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
101. See John Feffer, There’s a New Crash Coming, INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Sept. 19,
2018), https://ips-dc.org/theres-a-new-crash-coming/; Basav Sen, Killing for Coal
(Literally), INST. FOR POL’Y STUD. (Aug. 28, 2018), https://ips-dc.org/killing-for-coalliterally/.
102. See Feffer, supra note 101.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See Sen, supra note 101.
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additional soot and ozone pollution by 2030, thanks to its proposed
rules.106

The IPS and other, more progressive research organizations compel us to
look beyond quantitative analyses of deregulatory success to qualitative
factors involving the effects of regulatory cutbacks in terms of, for
example, economic, environmental, and societal cost.
H. Mercatus Center
The mission of the Mercatus Center, founded over forty years ago as
the Center for the Study of Market Processes, 107 “is to generate
knowledge and understanding of the institutions that affect the freedom
to prosper and to find sustainable solutions that overcome the barriers
preventing individuals from living free, prosperous, and peaceful
lives.”108 Deregulation is one of its research topics of emphasis. 109
Although neither AllSides nor Media Bias/Fact Check rates the
Mercatus Center, it is well known to be a conservative think tank funded
in part by the Koch Family Foundations. 110
The Mercatus Center, like The Heritage Foundation, notes slower
regulatory growth in the first year of the Trump Administration. 111
Specifically, cited data indicates that
[d]uring President Trump’s first year, federal regulations grew by
about 0.65 percent, less than the growth rate of any other president’s
first year in office since our data begin in 1970. This rate of growth is

106. Id.
107. See History and Timeline, MERCATUS CTR., https://www.mercatus.org/content/
history-and-timeline (last visited Nov. 19, 2018).
108. About, MERCATUS CTR., https://www.mercatus.org/about (last visited Nov. 18,
2018).
109. See Regulation, MERCATUS CTR., https://www.mercatus.org/tags/regulation (last
visited Nov. 18, 2018) (“Mercatus research on regulation identifies opportunities to improve
the performance of the regulatory process and highlights market-based solutions to
regulatory goals.”).
110. See Mercatus Center, SOURCE WATCH, https://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/
Mercatus_Center (last visited Nov. 18, 2018).
111. See Patrick McLaughlin & Chad Reese, Is President Trump Dismantling the
Regulatory State?, MERCATUS CTR. (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/
commentary/president-trump-dismantling-regulatory-state (“While regulatory restrictions
have still increased since President Trump took office, they have grown at a much slower
pace than has historically been the case.”).
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also less than one-third of the long-term annual growth rate for federal
regulations, which, from 1970 to 2016, was about 2.1 percent.112

In August 2018, a Mercatus Center research fellow expressed cautious
optimism that the limited growth of regulation during the Trump
Administration could have a positive economic impact, 113 while being
careful not to attribute current positive economic trends to the Trump
Administration’s deregulatory policies. 114
In an October 2018 opinion column, a Mercatus senior research fellow
similarly cites to the Trump Administration’s claimed deregulation
success (as a function of regulatory cost savings), while also noting that
this success is relatively limited and that the process of deregulation
forwarded by the administration is capable of improvement.115 “The new
regulatory budgeting system is a much needed step in the right direction,
likely delivering some meaningful relief to citizens. But the new system
is far from perfect, and already we are seeing areas where it could be
improved.”116 Among other things, the column suggests that measuring
cost may not be the optimal way to measure true deregulatory effect, for
a variety of reasons.117 “If the administration instead relied on a simpler
measure than cost, it could create an accounting system for the entire
federal regulatory system.”118
III. ADDITIONAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE
PRESIDENT’S DEREGULATORY REGIME
The publications and resources of think tanks and other research
organizations in Part II identify a number of success metrics (for
example, number of regulations eliminated or adopted; decrease in
paperwork hours or regulatory cost; impact on employment, the economy,
or social welfare; etc.) that bear significantly more scrutiny—scrutiny
that this Essay does not permit. It is safe to say, however, that the

112. Patrick McLaughlin, Regulatory Data on Trump’s First Year, MERCATUS CTR. (Jan.
30, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/publications/regulatory-data-trump-first-year.
113. See James Broughel, Regulation Rollback and the ‘Trump Bump’, MERCATUS CTR.
(Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/regulation-rollback-andtrump-bump (“The regulatory tide has slowed to a crawl. This may be giving the economy
a needed reprieve, with the potential for greater gains to come.”).
114. Id.
115. James Broughel, How to Improve Trump’s Regulatory Budget, WASH. EXAMINER
(Oct. 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/how-to-improvetrumps-regulatory-budget.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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salience of the various metrics largely depends on context. Specifically,
deregulatory success relates to the extent to which the desired outcomes
of the deregulation have been achieved. Thus, under these metrics,
success is somewhat in the eye of the beholder; each observer has a
perspective founded on its core policy mission that is reflected in its
choice of a success metric and mode of assessment.
Yet, the impacts of business deregulation can be evaluated in several
value-neutral ways. For example, one might ask whether the
deregulation results in positive changes in the regulated businesses and
whether these actual substantive deregulatory benefits exceed the
attendant costs—including specifically, transition costs and costs
associated with a loss of public trust. In this part of the Essay, I reflect
briefly on these cost-benefit questions.
Those who favor deregulation for substantive operational reasons
(including, in the business realm, to decrease the costs associated with
manufacturing or distributing goods or providing services) may assume
that their deregulatory program always actually results in the expected
salutary effects. Yet, regulation may persist in the wake of deregulation,
including at the firm level. There are a number of reasons for this.
Firm-level regulatory personnel may resist the return to a less
regulated operational state. “The increased hordes of in-house regulators
will ‘not go gentl[y] into that good night.’ That is, they will attempt to
fortify their influence within the firm regardless of deregulation . . . . [I]nhouse regulators have their own incentives and want to keep their jobs
even in a deregulatory environment.”119
Moreover, regulation that decreases the cost of production in the short
term may result in long-term harms in the form of increased litigation
risk or other losses. One observer notes the long-term effects of
deregulating an aspect of building construction:
A few years back, California’s then governor, Arnold Schwartzenegger
[sic], signed a bill easing fire prevention regulation during
construction of buildings that resulted in short-term savings for some
builders. But when a major fire in March 2014 destroyed a large
building under construction in San Francisco, owners of nearby
buildings also destroyed by the fire—and insurance companies

119. Kirby M. Smith, In-House Regulators: Documenting the Impact of Regulation on
Internal Firm Structure, 36 YALE J. ON REG. BULL. 22, 24 (2018) (footnote omitted); see also
Samantha Gross, The Danger in Deregulation, BROOKINGS (Jan. 9, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/planetpolicy/2018/01/09/the-danger-in-deregulation/
(“Many companies, particularly large international corporations, are unlikely to
substantially change their practices in response to the regulatory rollback.”).
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covering the hundreds of millions in damages—were left wondering if
the short-term savings had been worth it.120

If deregulation creates known increased litigation prospects, a regulated
business may decide to continue to conduct business consistent with its
pre-deregulatory practices.121
In addition, in certain cases, businesses may be hesitant to abandon a
regulatory regime that has prompted net beneficial introspection or
operational change.
[T]he recent court ruling removing the section of the Dodd-Frank Act
requiring manufacturers to disclose the source of minerals used in
their products (to determine if they came from areas in Africa where
human rights abuses are rife) may prove . . . to be a pyrrhic victory for
business. Doubtless, the due diligence required in tracing the supply
chain of tin, tungsten, and tantalum back to their original sources
demands a costly process of investigation, but my sources in Silicon
Valley privately confide that they were benefiting from taking a closer
look at their supply chains, hoping to find ways to substitute for some
expensive minerals, and identify more cost-effective sources of others.
One manager told me this process was causing his company to
examine easy assumptions they had made about their operations that,
on closer scrutiny, didn’t hold up.122

In other words, regulation may create indirect benefits that motivate
sustained reliance on related processes and initiatives even when the
regulatory burden is reduced or eliminated.
It also is significant to note that deregulation, like all regulatory
change, causes transition costs. These costs exist regardless of the
purported or actual substantive merit of the deregulation from a legal,
social, political, or economic perspective. 123 They comprise, for example,
120. James O’Toole, The Hidden Business Benefits of Regulation, STRATEGY+BUS. (Apr.
24, 2014), https://www.strategy-business.com/blog/The-Hidden-Business-Benefits-of-Regu
lation?gko=61916.
121. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 119 (“Many companies, particularly large international
corporations, are unlikely to substantially change their practices in response to the
regulatory rollback, as they have global operating procedures to prevent safety and
environmental incidents that could harm their assets or reputation.”); Smith, supra note
119, at 45 (“[O]nce a monitoring system is put into place, it may act as a one-way ratchet—
the Board will be unlikely to remove the system because it fears that it may subject it to
Caremark liability.”).
122. O’Toole, supra note 120.
123. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, The Costs of Legal Change, 49 UCLA L. REV.
789, 869 (2002) (“[A]part from customary debates about substantive benefits and costs,
legal systems will experience friction simply in adjusting to the existence of new legal
norms.”).
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costs associated with learning the new regulatory regime, various types
of uncertainty, reviewing and revising practice forms and materials,
changes to transactional practice conventions and norms,
misinterpretations or misapplications of the new rules, and
governmental adjustments to processes and procedures.124
As a result, the fact of regulatory change may be detrimental enough
for some of the regulated that they would prefer to stay in a stable
regulated state than be subjected to deregulation and re-regulation in
response to political, social, or economic changes.125 This desire to
entrench in a pre-existing regulatory state in response to deregulation is
consistent with observed benefits of “sticky” regulations—rules that are
hard to change because of ossification. Specifically, continued voluntary
compliance with regulatory constraints after deregulation, like sticky
regulations, has value because the attendant certainty and predictability
of applicable rules may encourage market participation.126
Finally, there may be reputational and trust-related costs or questions
arising from deregulation that should be assessed and addressed.
Deregulation may be interpreted as privatization—a government
abandonment of certain people or sectors, fostering potential negative
impacts on public trust.127 Reflecting on business deregulation during the
Carter and Reagan presidencies, one commentator offered his view that
“[d]eregulation was very good for a small elite group of investors and
owners, but not good for the large group of workers in every industry.”128

124. See id. at 816–52.
125. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 119 (“[T]he energy industry invests primarily in capitalintensive, long-lived assets . . . . A stable policy environment is important to these
investments. Regulations and policy that are created in one administration can be rolled
back in another, and the instability creates a challenge for managing and valuing such
assets. Energy companies crave regulatory certainty.”).
126. See Aaron L. Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85, 116–17 (2018)
(“Ossification . . . acts as a commitment mechanism. Absent this mechanism, basic
economics suggests that regulated parties sometimes would be less likely to participate in
the market, or at least to participate as much as the agency would like, because the
investment would be riskier.” (footnote omitted)).
127. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 119 (“[T]he hard push toward deregulation is likely to
have consequences for public trust . . . . If the public feels that the government is being run
by and for the energy industry, accomplishing many important societal goals—like
modernizing infrastructure and preventing the worst impacts of climate change—become
much more difficult.”).
128. Michael Collins, Did Deregulation Work?, INDUSTRY WEEK (Oct. 26, 2016), https://
www.industryweek.com/regulations/did-deregulation-work.
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IV. FORESEEABLE EFFECTS OF DEREGULATION ON BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS AND TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERING
In theory, deregulation should open up possibilities for business
transactions—new or larger transactions. In 2017, the Council of
Economic Advisors articulated the standard rationale for this theoretical
observation: “Regulations serve as an additional tax on the U.S. economy,
often making beneficial economic transactions more expensive or
preventing them outright.”129 Remove the tax, and the incentives for
engaging in those beneficial transactions become more favorable.
Regardless, regulatory change—including deregulation—always
seems to generate significant activity for lawyers. This is as true for
transactional business lawyers as it is for other lawyers. Among other
things, transactional business lawyers must engage with and understand
deregulation in their roles as transaction cost engineers—intermediaries
in business transactions who use their applied knowledge of the law to
cost-optimize transactional structures and execution for their clients.
Twenty-five years ago, Professor Ronald Gilson expressly identified
this aspect of business transactional lawyering, labeling it “transaction
cost engineering.”130 Effectively, “[t]he regulatory system itself . . . serves
as an invitation to the targets of the regulation to structure transactions
so that their form falls outside the terms of the regulation.” 131 That being
the case, a transactional business lawyer’s correct and complete
understanding of the regulatory or deregulatory environment in which
the client’s transaction occurs is key to the lawyer’s value proposition. A
business transactional lawyer can only assess transaction costs in a

129. COUNCIL ECON. ADVISORS, THE GROWTH POTENTIAL OF DEREGULATION 1, 10 (Oct.
2, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/documents/The%20Grow
th%20Potential%20of%20Deregulation.pdf.
130. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 255 (1984) [hereinafter Gilson, Value Creation]. Specifically,
Gilson theorizes as follows:
Lawyers function as transaction cost engineers, devising efficient mechanisms
which bridge the gap between capital asset pricing theory’s hypothetical world
of perfect markets and the less-than-perfect reality of effecting transactions in
this world. Value is created when the transactional structure designed by the
business lawyer allows the parties to act, for that transaction, as if the
assumptions on which capital asset pricing theory is based were accurate.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Ronald J. Gilson, Lawyers as Transaction Cost
Engineers, in THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 508–14 (Peter
Newman ed., 1998) (expanding on the transaction cost engineering theory); Praveen Kosuri,
Beyond Gilson: The Art of Business Lawyering, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463, 468 (2015)
(“Gilson concluded that business lawyers earn their keep by engineering deals to increase
overall value by decreasing inefficiencies.”).
131. Gilson, Value Creation, supra note 130, at 297.
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specific context with accuracy if the lawyer can identify the applicable
legal rules and apply them impeccably to select the best available option
that will result in the client’s desired outcome.
As the Trump Administration proceeds, many regulatory systems
connected to business operations and transactions are undergoing
significant change. Deregulation is especially prevalent, and it interacts
in some cases in complex ways with increased regulation (for example,
through the increase in tariffs and other international trade barriers and
restrictions).132 These regulatory adjustments both reify and complicate
the business transactional lawyer’s role: the lawyer is both essential and
challenged.
The difficulty of the advisory context is exacerbated by an unclear
overall regulatory/deregulatory plan. The president’s decisions on
deregulation appear to be made individually and discretely. They are not
expressly connected to other applicable regulatory questions and systems
or a uniform policy objective. The resultant uncertainty and
unpredictability combine to put stress on the task of netting out
transaction costs and benefits. If legal counsel cannot accurately or
completely assess the effects of applicable deregulation, parties may
forego efficient transactions or enter into inefficient transactions. This
advisory environment puts the transactional business lawyer at risk for
reputational harm and, in exceptional cases, malpractice claims.
Professor Steven Schwarcz expanded on Professor Gilson’s theory by
identifying specific ways in which transactional business lawyers are
central to transaction cost engineering.133 One of Professor Schwarcz’s
contributions is of particular importance in a deregulatory environment:
the lawyer’s role in identifying, assessing, factoring in, and minimizing
litigation risk.134 Litigation risk is a moving target when regulatory
systems are in transition. This observation does not change the lawyer’s
role, but it does make it more difficult.
V. CONCLUSION
The Trump Administration has followed through on candidate
Trump’s promises to deregulate by using the informal and formal powers
of the presidency to effectuate and catalyze specific deregulatory
initiatives. Reform projects are being undertaken. Both the Trump
Administration and interested third-party observers have begun to
assess early successes. These commentators may, however, be missing
132. See supra notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text.
133. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486 (2007).
134. Id. at 492, 496–97.
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some significant elements in their individual and collective assessments.
In any event, the overall deregulatory agenda and its objectives—beyond
the simple end goal of decreasing regulation (whatever that may mean to
interested constituencies)—remain unclear.
Among the impacted constituencies are businesses and their legal
counsel. Both have an opportunity to evaluate and respond. Business
clients may incur or anticipate short-term or long-term costs that can be
avoided or minimized with focused preparation or action. These clients
will, no doubt, need lawyers (including business transactional lawyers)
to help ensure that they avoid or minimize these costs in operating and
transacting.
Observations made in this Essay may ultimately affect assessments of
the success of the Trump deregulation project, at least through the lens
of the business transactional lawyer. On the positive side, transactional
business lawyers likely are getting and will continue to get new business
and generate fees from the regulatory changes. Clients who are repeat
players in affected transactions will need new advice. To be competent to
give that advice, their lawyers will need to review, interpret, and process
the application of the new rules resulting from the deregulatory
modifications. Those lawyers may then be in a position to suggest
adjustments to business operations and create new contracts, forms, and
other operating tools and market them to existing or new clients.
Similarly, a transactional business lawyer can use her knowledge of the
deregulatory environment to promote new or different transactions to
past, current, or new clients. In addition, transactional business lawyers
may be involved in compliance enforcement actions under the new
regulatory regime.
On the negative side, uncertainty and unpredictability are likely to
plague both the business client and transactional business counsel. The
nature and trajectory of deregulation may be unclear. Moreover,
offsetting increases in regulation may complicate the lawyer’s applied
legal analysis of transaction costs and regulatory and litigation risk in
the new and expected deregulation environments. Evaluations of
deregulatory success should take these costs and risks into account.
In any event, as the Trump deregulatory experiment proceeds,
transactional business lawyers and their clients may sometimes find
themselves on the regulatory version of Mr. Toad’s Wild Ride—an
uncertain and unpredictable excursion through uncharted and
unfamiliar territory. Managing the adventure successfully will involve
perseverance as well as competence and diligence. The road may be
bumpy and the lawyer and client may end up off-roading at times. But,
as with other significant changes that impact transactional business
lawyering, deregulation in the Trump era is bound to provide healthy
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challenges to transactional lawyering heuristics. The rewards of carrying
on and completing the journey are certain to be substantial and provide
business counsel with useful educational opportunities.
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